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
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
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A SPECULATION ON THE

ORIGIN AND NATURE OF LIFE

By PROFESSOR ELLIOTT COUES

MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY; OF THE PHILOSOPHI-CAL AND BIOLOGICAL SOCIETIES OF WASHINGTON; ETC., ETC.

Second Boltion

"As thou art fitted to receive it, so shall the light be given thee" THE DEMON OF DARWIN



BOSTON

ESTES AND LAURIAT

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Anibersity Press : John Wilson and Son, Cambridge.

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WILLIAM B. TAYLOR,

LATELY PRESIDENT OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF WASHINGTON, LEARNED IN SCIENCE, WISE IN PHILOSOPHY, FAITHFUL IN ALL LIFE'S RELATIONS,

This Folume is Inscribed

WITH RESPECT AND FRIENDSHIP

BY

THE AUTHOR.



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"The most general truth, not admitting of inclusion in any other, "does not admit of interpretation. Of necessity therefore, explanation "must eventually bring us down to the inexplicable. The deepest truth "we can get at must be unaccountable."

H. SPENCER.

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"He who fuppofes, therefore, 'that the information of the fenfes is "'adequate (with the aid of mathematical reafoning) to explain phe-"'nomena of *all kinds*,' who refufes to admit 'that there are phyfical "'operations which are and ever will be incomprehenfible by us,' betrays "a very imperfect idea — no lefs of the impaffable limitations of finite "intellect, than of the fathomlefs profundity of Nature's fyftem. He "who thinks that by formally repudiating the myfterious, and confidently "difcarding the unknown, he thereby abolifhes or in the flighteft degree "diminifhes his infuperable nefcience of the ultimate, — but imitates "the offrich, and deludes himfelf."

W. B. TAYLOR.





I N the fpring of 1882 I was honored by an invitation, which I did not feel at liberty to difregard, from the Prefident of the Philofophical Society of Washington, to address that learned body upon the general problem of Life — Whence, What, How, and Why.

The fafcination of thefe queftions, perpetually afked and unanfwered, is due to the fact, that we know them to be unanfwerable, yet feel that they will be anfwered fomewhere, fomehow, fometime, by every human being, each for himfelf.

The fituation at the Philofophical Society I was given to underftand to be this: The retiring Prefident had in his laft addrefs difcuffed biology, contending that a certain "vital principle" caufed Life, or was at any rate neceffary for the purpofes of Living. This would feem to be a reafonable proposition; but it had been regarded as more or lefs unphilofophical or unfcientific, becaufe the Society had not fucceeded in finding out what the vital principle was, or indeed, where to find it at all. Mathematics had failed to find it at any point in the known dimensions of fpace. Physics

had failed to find it in any kinefis of attraction and repulfion. Chemiftry had failed to find it in any atomic or molecular combination. Then Biology — "The Science of Life" — had come to the refcue with a fubftance known as Protoplafm; for Phyfics had proven that nothing exifted but matter in motion; Chemiftry had proven that protoplafm was matter in motion; Biology had proven that Life was a mode of motion of matter; *ergo*, protoplafm was the vital principle; and it had been juft upon the point of being difcovered by the Society, when the protoplafm, which the Society had examined, died. So the vital principle had given them the flip, and the Phyfico-chemical Theory of Life had been unable to recover the fame. It having thus become evident that there was a difference between fomething alive and the fame thing dead, the "previous queftion" had obvioufly recurred.

I prepared what I had to fay on the fubject to the beft of my ability, and carried it to the Society with much mifgiving. For I could not fay what I truly thought — and what elfe fhould any man fay? — without introducing ftrangers to a felect body of Wafhington fcientifts — fuch as God, Spirit, and Soul, as factors in the problem of Life. Trufting, however, that their names were known, at leaft, I delivered the addrefs fubfequently entitled "Biogen."

No one who has frequented fcientific focieties can have failed to obferve how naïve and natural are our exhibitions of human nature. We "elder children" cannot be outdone by the youngeft in our harmlefs vanities. When fome one is fpeaking, for example, we who are liftening are bufy with our pencils and note-books. To put down the beft things he fays? To put down the good

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things even? Why fhould we? Thefe things take care of themfelves, do they not? We watch him like a hawk, to pay ourfelves for having to liften; to catch him tripping, and find fault with him afterwards, and have an excufe for fpeaking ourfelves. We are all too full of our own ideas to liften to any one's elfe for any othe purpofe, or on any other terms. We immediately rife to compliment the fpeaker with the most glittering generality, before confounding him with the utmost particularity. What could be more fimple, more natural, more human, more child-like?

On the occasion to which I refer, for example, a philosopher faid that he had listened to the, etc., address of the, etc., with the greateft, etc. But the speaker had adduced the confensus of mankind in support of his views, and the confensus of mankind was demonftrably erroneous in many particulars. For example, take the rainbow, which mankind had for years believed to be fet in the fky by the Deity, as a thing of beauty, and a token, and a promise. Whereas the triumphant progress of modern science had shown its scale to be due to the circular equality of angle in this locus of the water-spherules, and its color to the varied refraction of light. For the reft, he could only refer the speaker to the well-known properties of protoplasm, and the modern theory of evolution.

A philosopher, waiving the usual opening formula, ftated without referve that there could not be anything in anything he had heard me fay, because nothing existed but matter in motion.

A philosopher faid that he could not imagine how the speaker could seriously ask such a question as, What is the difference between a dead Amœba and a live Amœba? He should be almost ashamed to be called upon to answer such a simple question. From his manner I gathered that he wished I had asked him something hard.

A philosopher hoped that Professor Coues did not teach such herefies at the college where he habitually lectured.

A philosopher of an inquiring turn of mind, apparently, faid that I had spoken of "foul" and "spirit" as of things whereof a man might possible from the possible for the second second remain without scientific basis until the invention of a "biometer" to measure the cubic contents or avoirdupois of a man's foul-stuff. Upon which I could not help thinking, and so faying, that an instrument for measuring the soul should be the last thing some philosophers should wish to see invented — and applied.

A different kind of a philofopher fpoke for a few moments. I will not tranfcribe his remarks. Our eyes met, and I knew he underftood me. But the pertinence of moft of the remarks which followed the delivery of "Biogen" muft be left to the reader to difcover, upon perufal of the publifhed minutes of the meeting (fee Introduction). The general fense of the meeting was probably reflected in the remark made privately to me by one of my friends: "Damn good Englifh, Coues, and damn poor fense. You ought to get to be a good fquare flat-footed atheift, and then you won't take thefe fits."

When the queftion of publifhing "Biogen" came up, I afked the advice of one who I knew would endeavor to diffuade me, in order to learn his reafons. He begged me not to publifh it, for my own fake, becaufe it would "injure my fcientific reputation." Acting

upon this advice, and wifhing to difcover, if poffible, how an honeft expression of honeft convictions on any subject could injure any one's reputation for anything excepting infincerity, I immediately printed a small edition which was speedily exhausted.

The treatife having found favor in fome eyes in whofe penetration I have confidence is now republifhed without other change than the addition of this Preface, the following Introduction, an Appendix, and fome foot-notes here and there. Should the line of thought prefented be found to lead, or even to tend, in the right direction, it may be followed up hereafter; the Author being now in position to express himself more fully, freely and explicitly on the fubject than he was when "Biogen" was first published.

Living as I have been for many years in a fcientific atmosphere in which atheifm and a very crass materialism are rife, as the fashionable foibles of many men otherwise really great, who almost hide their folly with their erudition, their good fense, their thoufand manly and humane qualities, I am often told by fcientists that they have no fouls, and expect to die like dogs. What can I rejoin to fuch declarations from fuch fources? To fuch a one I can only answer evasively, that he muss know his own nature, and probable destiny, better than he can expect me to; and that if he thinks he has no foul, and is to die like a dog, I have no means of proving him wrong; but that, speaking for myself alone, I know that I have a foul, and that I shall not die like a dog, because it is the nature of the foul God has given me to know its immortal felf with a kind of knowledge in comparison with which the knowledge of material things acquired by the bodily fenses is no knowledge, but delution only — with a kind of knowledge whole fervant, not whole mafter, is reason — with a kind of confcious felf-confcious.

If my philosophy approves this confcious field, if my fcience supports and strengthens it, I am happy. If they do not, of what use are they to me? Idle, wasteful slaves, that eat into the life and substance of their master — not worth their keep.

Not many men, I fear, think; it tires them, and hurts their feelings; it ftrains their conftitutions; a more or lefs fequential feries of bodily fenfations is an eafier way through life, that "embarraffing predicament which precedes death," and faves the trouble of thinking. A few men think, and their hard thinking hardens the brain, and fets it in a mould, and no thought of another fhape can find fit or rest there. And the fpider of vanity fpins her web there, and nimbly traverfes its geometric threads, and lo! a fyftem of philofophy. But fuch fhall pafs alfo, brother philofopher; your fcience and mine muft bend the knee to our common humanity, there to learn that knowledge is not wifdom till it becomes felfknowledge, nor this mafterful till it has maftered felf. *Then*, forge the chains of your fyftems as you may; the verieft goffamer thread fhall be ftronger to bear you up than they to hold you down.





INTRODUCTION.

(Extracted from the Bulletin of the Philosophical Society of Washington, vol. v, pp. 102–105.)

"217th MEETING.

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MAY 6, 1882.

"Prefident WM. B. TAYLOR in the Chair.

"The first communication was by Mr. ELLIOTT COUES,

"ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF PROTOPLASM.

"The following is an abstract of this communication which has "been published at greater length under the title—'Biogen: a "'Speculation on the Origin and Nature of Life.' Abridged from "a paper on the 'possibilities of protoplasm,' read before the Philo-"fophical Society of Washington, May 6th, 1882. Washington: "Judd & Detweiler. 1882. 8vo, pp. 27.

"Referring to previous papers on the fubject of Life, by Mr. "WOODWARD and Mr. WARD, the fpeaker opposed any purely "phyfico-chemical theory, and adhered to the doctrine of the actual "existence of a 'vital principle.' Granting that all fubfances, in-

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"cluding protoplasm, have been evolved from nebulous matter; "that evolution to the protoplasmic state is necessary for any mani-"feftation of life and even that life neceffarily appears in matter "thus elaborated, it does not follow that the refult of the proceffes "by which matter is fitted to receive life is the *caule* of the vitality "manifested. For all that is known to the contrary protoplasm and "vitality are fimply concomitant; or if there is any caufal relation "between them, vital force is the caufe of the peculiar properties of "protoplasm, not the result of those properties. There really exists "a potency or principle called 'vital,' in virtue of which the chemi-"cal fubftance called protoplafm manifefts vitality, that is to fay, is "alive, and in the absence of which no protoplasmic or other mo-"lecular aggregation of matter can be alive. The chemico-phyfical "theory fimply reftates abiogenefis, or 'fpontaneous generation,' of "which we know nothing fcientifically. The grave doubt that "'life is a property of protoplafm' will perfistently intrude until "fome one flows what is the chemico-physical difference between "living and dead protoplafm; none being known.

"The fpeaker argued for the existence of the foul as fomething "apart from and unlike matter, defining 'foul' as that quantity of "fpirit which any living body may or does poffers. No idea can "attach to the term 'fpirit,' from which all conceptions of matter "are not abfolutely excluded. Spirit is immaterial felf-confcious "force; life confifts in the animation of matter by fpirit.

"The fubftance of mind and the fubftance of matter were noted as "equally hypothetical. To the former was given the name *Biogen*,

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"or foul-ftuff, and it was defined as fpirit in combination with the "minimum of matter neceffary to its manifeftation. The analogy "between biogen and luminiferous æther, or the hypothetical fub-"ftance of light, was difcuffed. The drift of the fpeaker's fpecula-"tion on the vital principle as an *ens realifimum* was toward a "reftatement, in fcientific terms, of the old *anima mundi* theory." Modern materialiftic and atheiftic notions about life were de-"nounced as every one of them difguifes of the monftroufly abfurd "ftatement that a felf-created atom of matter could lay an egg that "would hatch.

"The whole matter being beyond the fcrutiny of the phyfical "fenfes is remote from the fcope of exact fcience; but it is irra-"tional and unfcientific to deny it, as is virtually done when fcience "excludes it from any fhare in life-phenomena, by prefuming to "explain life upon purely material confiderations. No chemico-"phyfical theory of life is tenable which does not fatisfactorily ex-"plain the difference between, for example, a live amœba and a "dead one; an explanation which has never yet been, and probably "cannot be, given.

"A general difcuffion of the points involved in this paper fol-"lowed. Mr. POWELL pointed out what he regarded as a funda-"mental and fatal error in the reafoning, viz., that the axiom that "the whole equals the fum of all its parts, had been affumed "throughout to be true *qualitatively* as well as quantitively. Fur-"thermore, he maintained that logical confiftency required that "thofe who believed in force fhould also believe in the vital prin-"ciple, and vice verfa. As for himfelf, however, there was neither "force nor vital principle, but only matter in motion. Three rela-"tions are always to be borne in mind, viz., quantity, quality, and "fucceffion, whereas the phyficift falls into error by confidering "only the quantitive relation.

"So much of the fupport of the views of Mr. COUES as might be "derived from the common confenfus of mankind was criticifed "by Mr. GILL as unfound, fince the common confenfus of mankind "has often been found at fault; the fuppofed flatnefs of the earth, "the motion of the fun around the earth, etc., are examples where "this criterion fails. Paraphrafing an eminent philofopher's dic-"tum, he thought there was a tendency of biologifts ignorant of phi-"lofophy and philofophers ignorant of biology to make a diffinction "between organic and inorganic matter, and call in a 'vital force.' "He likened living and dead protoplafm to an electric battery in "action and at reft, and maintained that life is a property of matter, "and that it cannot be conceived of feparated from matter.

"Mr. HARKNESS avowed his belief in force, and hence in vital "force, and further in a little religion, and was, therefore, moved "to make inquiry concerning the chemical difference between liv-"ing and dead matter.

"Mr. WARD pointed out that very diverfe views were held upon "this fubject by two claffes of thinkers who do not come into intel-"lectual contact. Furthermore, while not afferting that vital force "was a fuperfition, attention was drawn to the fact that infantile "races attribute all phenomena to fupernatural agencies, and that, "with increasing knowledge, there is a decrease in the number of "these appeals to fupernatural agencies. "The corner-ftone of modern fcience, faid Mr. DOOLITTLE, is "meafure. We muft have a biometer. What electrical fcience "would be without ohms, aftronomy without graduated circles, "chemiftry without the balance, fuch is biology without a mea/ure. "Is there more life in two mice than in one moufe? In a horse "than in a moufe? Until we can anfwer these questions substantial "progress in biology is not to be expected.

"After fome further defultory difcuffion the Society adjourned."



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Mr. Prefident and Gentlemen of the Society :

A NY reafon I might have found for declining your invitation to fpeak on this fubject could only have come from moral cowardice. I fhould have had, therefore, no alternative to compliance, even had I had no courage to proceed but that of conviction. But I was given to underftand that you might neither be unwilling to have the general biological problem reopened, nor indifpofed to hear with forbearance at leaft from any one of your number who might have ideas upon the fubject, with a view to difcufs fuch propositions as he might be willing and able to advance.

So far am I from fuppoing that the *crux* of the life-problem will be folved to-night, I do not hefitate to declare my belief that it has been refolved neither by fcience nor by philofophy, and that it is infoluble in any royal water that can be

compounded of to-day's fcience and philosophy. Confronted as I am with fomething I believe to be infcrutable to man's unaided reafon - oppofed as are my convictions to fome of the brave theories which have been advanced in this Society refpecting that fomething-profoundly unknowing as I am of the origin and nature of Life, I fhould defift with this honeft confession of ignorance and seek its afylum, were I not alfo convinced that much truth in the matter of the lifeproblem is to be had for the afking by any one who makes full use of all his faculties; were not my views in the main those which, in substance, under whatever form of expression, have been affirmed by the confenfus of mankind fince when the human creature became poffeffed of a rational foul; and were I not fatisfied that anything I could fay, feeming new and being true, would be no news, but fomething as old as the mind of man.

In expreffing one's felf upon matters which are rather those of reasonable inference than of demonstration, there is danger of dogmatizing just in proportion to strength of belief; but that unscientific, unphilosophical, and offensive practice is avoided when individual convictions are given with the reasons upon which they are based, with perfect intellectual candor, with deferved contempt for mere logomachy, and with due deference to those different opinions which may be

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but varying views of a fingle many-fided truth. In fuch fpirit as this, I beg your indulgence in a train of thought not put together to fuftain any theory of my own, but to difcover truth, if poffible.

It cannot be amifs to bring up certain papers lately laid before the Society, and treat them as if under difcuffion to-night. One of thefe is Dr. J. J. Woodward's addrefs, as the retiring Prefident, on "Modern Philofophic Conceptions of Life," and others are Mr. Lefter F. Ward's, on the "Evolution of the Chemical Elements" and of the "Organic Compounds." If I correctly appreciate their refpective fignificance, they embody oppofite and probably irreconcilable views — Mr. Ward fetting forth the chemico-phyfical theory of life, and Dr. Woodward inclining to what may be termed the vitaliftic theory.*

* The fpeaker quoted as follows from Dr. Woodward's published address:---

P. 18. "I have already afferted that there are whole groups of phenomena characteriftic of living beings and peculiar to them, which cannot be intelligently explained as the mere refultants of the operation of the chemical and phyfical forces of the univerfe. These phenomena I refer — I own it without hesitation — to the operations of a vital principle, in the existence of which I believe as firmly as I do in the existence of force, though I do not know its nature any more than I know the nature of force."

P. 20. "I willingly admit that, in view of our prefent notions of the

As a mafter of many departments of fcience, and in a mafterly manner, Dr. Woodward appears to have reviewed much that is actually known of the conditions and manifeftations of life, with a fair ftatement of much that is unknown, arguing againft the adequacy of the chemico-phyfical theory, maintaining the exiftence and operation of a "vital principle," and declaring that while the idea of a univerfal creative mind has claims to be a tenable fcientific hypothefis, neither fcience nor philofophy affords any proven bafis for the moft univerfal

cofmogony, it is impoffible to believe that life always exifted upon this planet. I willingly admit that life on the earth muft have had a beginning in time. But we do not know how it began. Let us honeftly confefs our ignorance. I declare to you I think the old Hebrew belief, that life began by a creative act of the Univerfal Mind, has quite as good claims to be regarded a fcientific hypothefis, as the fpeculation that inorganic matter ever became living by virtue of its own forces merely."

P. 20. There is . . . "a philosophy which recognizes the validity of the mind's felf-confcioufness as at least fully equal to the validity of its confcioufness of the conditions of the body by which it obtains a knowledge of the external world. By this felf-confcioufness I know, with a certainty which no doubt can ever disturb, that I have a mind; and by rightly applying my reasoning powers to the data of my felf-confcioufness I can learn much that will be useful to me with regard to my mental processes and the methods of applying them. But here I have to ftop. I can learn nothing, whether by confcious mind, and however much it may long for immortality, neither philosophy nor fcience afford any foundation of proof upon which it may reft."

of human beliefs — the existence in man of an immortal foul. Paffages that have been quoted flow their author to be fatiffied of the infufficiency of fcience and philofophy to explain the mystery of life, and fo explain himfelf to himfelf; fo that, if he defires that which most men defire, he must look elfewhere for the fatisfaction of that defire. I doubt not most honest thinkers have found precifely the fame difficulty. It is a very grave one, which usually increases, instead of diminishing, the farther we go in the curriculum of the natural fciences in our reliance upon "pure reason" — a lamp which finally ferves not to light the way, but only to make the darkness visible.

I recur in the fequel to what I underftand the "vital principle" to be. But firft to touch upon the "chemico-phyfical theory of life," as maintained by Mr. Ward, who needs no reaffurance of the profound refpect I have for his intellectual proceffes, widely as we differ refpecting the validity of his refults; whofe logic is fo clear and cogent, whofe illuftration is fo lucid and copious, that his conclutions would be inevitable were his poftulates admiffible. The flaw feems to be in the indictment by which matter may literally be faid to be put on trial for its life. The central idea of his papers on the evolution from nebulous matter of the chemical elements and all other known forms is, — progreffive increafe in complexity of the molecular units of all fubftances, with correfpond-

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ing increment of molecular mafs and corresponding decrement of ftability of combination * — fuch molecular aggregates progreffing in inftability until a ftage is reached where the refulting aggregations, no longer molecular, but rather molar, are fo unftable that new and higher activities become poffible, and perceptible molar movements may take place; these actually occurring at the ftage of aggregation reached by the fubftance called "protoplasm;" life confifting in fuch mode of motion as the particles of protoplasm manifest, and being therefore a property of protoplasm, an effential or intrinsfic quality of matter, in virtue of its own mechanical and chemical forces; in other words, that life inheres in matter, and is fimply the refultant of material forces; " the most profound truth, both of biology and of chemisftry," being, in Mr. Ward's view, "that life is the refult of the aggregation of matter." †

* The expression of this idea ascribed to Socrates by Plato is, — that compounded things, or such as are compoundable, admit of being diffipated at the fame rate that they were compounded.

t The propositions above stated are summed in their author's own words as follows: —

"The general law above flated, that in the progress of the evolution of matter from the simplest elemental flate to the most complex organic compound, there has constantly been increase in the mass and decrease in the flability of the molecules, holds good throughout; and to it may now be added a third principle, obviously correlated to the above and conflituting merely a corollary to it, that *pari passi* with these changes there has

I have never feen elfewhere fo fair a ftatement of the chemico-phyfical theory, fo ably fupported; and the chain of reafoning by which diffufe nebulous matter is linked to the tiffue of living things appeals to my mind with great cogency. But I think the lurking fallacy is no lefs dangerous than deplorable.

For, granted that all fubftances, including protoplafm, have been evolved from nebulous matter; granted, that evolution to the protoplafmic ftate, and in the very manner claimed, is

been an increase in the activity of the properties manifested. . . . In protein bodies these molecular activities are much more extensive and varied than are those of fimpler bodies. The molecular units are fo much larger that their motions must be, as it were, molar in comparison, while within these larger primary units there are lesser units of different orders of aggregation, each of which manifests its own appropriate activities, and thus modifies the general properties of the whole. . . . From the molecule of hydrogen to that of albumen the process of evolution has been uniformly the fame, namely, that of compounding and recompounding, of doubly and multiply compounding : in fhort, it has been the process of molecular aggregation. It would be contrary to the law of uniformity in natural phenomena, upon the recognition of which modern fcience is based, to assume an abrupt change in the process at this point; and upon those who maintain such a *latus* must rest the burden of proof. . . . That the recompounding of the protein bodies should refult in a new form posses possible possi as that the addition of a molecule of oxygen should convert the hydrides into alcohols."

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required for any manifeftation of life; granted even, that life always appears in matter thus elaborated; it does not follow, that the refult of the procefs by which matter is fitted to receive life is the *caufe* of the vitality it manifefts. Sequence is not neceffarily confequence; and in this cafe it does not feem that even a *poft hoc*, much lefs a *propter hoc*, can be maintained. For all that is known to the contrary, protoplafm and vitality are fimply concomitant. If any caufal relation is to be eftablifhed, it muft be upon other confiderations than have been prefented. I believe the relation to be caufal, but the reverfe of that claimed; vital force being the caufe of the peculiar properties of protoplafm.

I adhere without refervation to the doctrine that there really exifts a potency or principle called "vital," in virtue of which the chemical fubftance called protoplafm manifefts the rudimentary phenomena of life; that is to fay, *is alive*; and in the abfence of which no protoplafmic or other molecular aggregation of matter can or does manifeft fuch phenomena; that is to fay, *be alive*. Chief among the impoffibilities of protoplafm appears to me to be the fpontaneous generation of life by any method of chemical or mechanical movement imprefied upon matter by the operation of forces inherent in itfelf. That the chemico-phyfical theory is merely a reftatement of the theory of "fpontaneous generation" is

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felf-evident, and the difficulty is increased by the affumption that mechanical and chemical conditionings of matter are adequate to refult in life. It is an unqueftionable fcientific fact that fpontaneous generation has never been demonftrated to have occurred in a fingle inftance, with or without the operation of a vital force in addition to purely phyfical forces, though every fuppofed condition of vitality has been artificially brought about. The fcientific fact is - and by fcientific fact I mean fomething politively known to be true --that life has never been afcertained to have any other origin than in antecedent life. For all that is known to the contrary, fuch antecedent is no lefs neceffary to the existence of vitality than is protoplasmic matter neceffary to the manifestation of vitality. The grave doubt that "Life is a property of protoplasm," refulting from the way in which the particles of that fubftance are aggregated and arranged, will perfift obtrufively, I think, until the chemico-phyfical theory accounts for the difference between a live among and a dead among a I fhould fay there is all the difference in the world, and that this difference is just the point at iffue. Until that explanation is forthcoming, the theory mentioned remains not a logical inference, but a pure affumption — a hypothetical link in a chain of being found just too short by one link.

I recognize the fact, which no biologift queftions, that life

may and does precede "organization," and therefore exifts in matter independently of organization. Since an amœba exhibits the rudiments of organization, having a nucleus and often a membrane in addition to its fubftance proper, let us take a ftill fimpler living thing - a plaffon-body, which is merely a particle of animated matter, shapeless, structureless, unorganized, and abfolutely homogeneous; yet manifefting, for an allotted period, the phenomena neceffary to any predication of life, namely: it moves, it feels, it feeds, it propagates, it may be killed; and thefe things could not be were it not alive. The phyfical properties of a plaffon-body, which is fimply unorganized protoplasm, are well known to you. Its chemical composition, as given on good authority, is, in 100 parts, 54 of carbon, 21 of oxygen, 16 of nitrogen, 7 of hydrogen, and 2 of fulphur. But, has a *living* plaffon-body ever been refolved into its chemical elements? I fould think it would be thoroughly killed before the analyfis were over. If fo, living protoplafm has never been and cannot be analyzed, and its composition remains unknown. For, according to the chemico-phyfical theory, it lives only in virtue of its peculiar chemical and phyfical conflitution; it lives neceffarily, fimply becaufe it is protoplafm; but, if fo, protoplafm is only itfelf when it is living; when it is dead, it is fomething elfe; therefore, this fomething elfe is what is analyzed; and in

what life confifts has eluded the process. A contradiction in terms is here implied, and an abfurdity is made manifest; for if there be any knowable difference in chemical and phyfical conflitution between a living and a dead cell, or other fimple protoplasmic body, such difference is unknown; to all physical and chemical tefts that have been applied, they are identical. I anticipate the ready reply, that chemistry only claims to know what elementary fubftances, in what proportions, conftitute protoplafm, not pretending to fay what particular manner of aggregation of their molecular units refults in life. But fuch answer, fo far from doing away with a phyfical difficulty, feeks refuge in a metaphyfical fubtlety. For if life neceffarily refulted from the compounding of certain elementary fubftances in certain proportions, and in a certain way, there is prefent and operative *fomething* adequate to effect fuch refult, abfence or non-operation of which fomething refults in death. Becaufe, the moment thefe identical elementary fubstances, combined in the identical proportions, flip into any other way of molecular interaction and molecular inter-adjustment, they cease to manifest the phenomena of life. What holds them just as they are in life, neither chemiftry nor phyfics flows. I give reafons, beyond, for affuming that the *fomething* is that particular thing called vital force. This hypothesis is *à priori* as legitimate and reasonable as

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any other can be in a cafe where all is as purely fpeculative as any metaphyfical queftion can be. For all that relates to the ultimate atoms of matter — fuppofing any fuch things to exift — to their number, fize, fhape, mafs, diftance apart, mode of motion and interaction, is beyond human fcrutiny, and, therefore, remote from the domain of exact fcience.

If fuch confiderations have any weight, the theory under difcuffion would appear to proceed in a logical manner from purely fpeculative premifes to an equally fatisfactory conclufion. It is not on fcientific ground until it explains what phyfical and chemical difference there is between a living and a dead plaffon-body; for the difference muft be phyfical and chemical only, fince only phyfical and chemical forces are admitted to be concerned in its production. Chemiftry and phyfics finding no difference, we may be permitted, indeed we are obliged, to look elfewhere for explanation of the very great difference obvious between a thing alive and the fame thing dead.

Numberlefs organic compounds have been manufactured in the laboratory which differ in no wife from the fame compounds effected in nature by vital force, excepting that they have never fhown a trace of life; fo that I fhould fay that the abfence or prefence of that effence is precifely the difference between the artificial and the natural product. In

fhort, phyfics and chemistry have combined to manufacture an egg which will do everything you could expect of an egg, excepting hatch. Pardon me if I go a step further, and sum the charge thus:

The atheiftic phyficift, denying mind in nature, declares that matter alone exifts. Where it came from is no matter. It exifts; it is matter in motion. Matter in motion is all there is in the univerfe. The Cofmos is matter in motion, in virtue of its material forces alone.* But does it occur to fuch a phyficift that he has invented juft what he has always declared to be a phyfical impoffibility? For he has fimply invented a huge "perpetual-motion" machine, which runs of itfelf until it wears out or breaks down. Worfe than this, he literally forgets himfelf, the inventor, for he fays his machine

[* "Give to the ambitious kinematic artift his cloud of fand, — or if he prefer the outfit, let him be furnished with an indefinite quantity of a perfectly continuous incompressible fluid — bound up if you please in a chain of 'vortex rings,' — by no motions or compositions of motions continued through the æons of eternity — could he ever manufacture therefrom either a lever or a rope. The kinematic gospel of a *mechanical* theory of primæval motion is therefore a sophism and illusion. It is founded on a misconception of the very *effence* of true mechanics. And the system that would proudly aspire to an architecture of a Kosmos from the elements of matter disrobed and denuded of every quality but motion, would achieve as its highest triumph and product — a universe of dust and ashes." — TAVLOR, Bull. Philos. Soc. Washington, v, p. 167.] invented itfelf and fet itfelf a-going. Then the materialiftic chemift takes this felf-invented perpetual-motion machine, and declares that it has laid an egg that will hatch.

Thus far we have only flood on the threshold of life, to witnefs fuch faint beginnings of vitality as a fpeck of protoplafm exhibits. On any theory that the physical forces inherent in matter are alone concerned, the way darkens as we proceed from moner to man. Few perfons are more thorough and confiftent Evolutionists than I may claim to be, and if you give me a live plaffon-body I will engage to make a living human body out of it on the most approved biological principles. In fact, we know that the physical bodies of all organized beings confift either of a fingle cell or of a multitude of cells, each of which is, in effect, an individual plaffon-body, born of a parent like itfelf, living for a while in the enjoyment of its appropriate activities, and then dying. The human body confifts of a myriad fuch plaffon-bodies, not all alike, indeed, but become very different in form and function in their defcent with modification from their common progenitors, the female ovum and the male fpermatozoon — the differentiation of ftructure and fpecialization of function of the various tiffues of the body being fuch that the refult may be aptly compared to a fociety of different fpecies of amœba-like animals, -bone-amœbas, brain-amœbas, muscle-amœbas, and the reft;

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all the individuals of which fpecies of animals are in ceafelefs procefs of birth, growth, maturation, decay, and death. Such language is, of courfe, not figurative illuftration of an idea, but fimple ftatement of obferved fact. I am ready to believe, and I do, that the chain of life is unbroken from moner to man, miffing links being only hidden links, fo far as the genetic relation of the phyfical body of a man to the fame of a moner is concerned. But now I find myfelf not only toffed from one horn to the other of a dilemma, but loft in the intricacies of a polylemma, to extricate myfelf from which all the natural potencies to be found in the phyfics and chemiftry of matter have, in fact, proven their inadequacy.

Firft, if the chain of living being has a beginning and an end, anywhere, anyhow, at any time, the links overhauled fall fhort in both directions. For, at one end, the original arch-amœba is as much of a myftery as ever; we know not where he came from, how he got there, or in what the effence of his plaffonity fubfifts. At the other end, we find our bodies to be a menagerie of amœbas, which we cannot difpofe of intelligently, and the finale of which is as much a myftery as their origination; feeing that we know not what, if anything, will happen when our death difperfes them.

Second, if the chain of living being is endlefs, it neceffarily

returns upon itfelf, and all reafoning upon its courfe is reafoning in a circle. We fimply fay that if A is B, B is A; which proves nothing as to the nature of A or B.

Thirdly, no whole can be greater or lefs than the fum of its parts, or quantitatively different from fuch fum. But a particle of living plaffon is greater than the fum of all its known parts, poffeffing that which none of its known parts poffeffes, — Life. And, *à fortiori*, the higheft and most complex organism, man, possess many things that none of its protoplass parts possess and things as will, memory, and understanding — fuch things as faith, hope, and confcience, are properties of protoplass; it being indisputable that fuch qualities and attributes do reside in human beings, if our confciouss and our fenses have any reliability; and if they have not, we know nothing whatever.

Once more, and efpecially, if the univerfe is a felf-invented perpetual-motion machine — if matter has always and alone exifted, and has always had the felf-determining potency of life, and at length did fo determine itfelf to become living, and if man, the final outcome, is felf-determined protoplafmic material only, a God is not only fuperfluous but impoffible. Yet the refult of the alleged felf-evolution of felf-created primordial matter through chemical elements to organic compounds has been the creation of a protoplafmic mind, fo con-

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fituted that in the overwhelming majority of inftances it can and does, and muft, believe in a God. If matter be that God, matter contradicts itfelf, for the conflictution of the human foul requires that its God fhall be other than its protoplasmic felf. If matter be not that God, there muft be some other. A protoplasmic mind can only escape that conviction by denying that itself exists; which would be absurd, were it not impossible.

The evolution of human reafon and human faith, in fhort, of a "rational foul," being among the poffibilities afcribed to protoplafm, or fome ulterior compounding of matter, a train of confequences ought logically to follow, which, in point of fact, do not follow. The almost universal fentiment of mankind is religious in fome kind or degree, and certain afpirations are the common endowment of our race. Those whose Deity is protoplasmic probably never worship that fubstance, and in fact appear quite indifferent to its divinely transcendent attributes; yet fome form of worfhip is omniprevalent; and if protoplaim be not a proper object of worthip as a creative omnipotence, and be not capable of fatisfying the afpirations it has evoked, it is fallacious and delufive, through failure to fulfil its own conditioning of human reafon and the faith of mankind. In a word, it gives the lie to its own logic.

How it may appear to others, I, of courfe, cannot fay; appeal to the data of my own confcioufnefs decides the real gravamen of the objections I have raifed. Argument is fu-I can only declare that I do not believe my mind to be tile. matter-made only, becaufe it is fo made that I cannot fo If I be believe, feeing not the flighteft reafon therefor. wrong, it is fome confolation to reflect, that fo far from my being peculiarly deceived, the confenfus of mankind has reached the identical conclusion; fo that any required afylum of ignorance proves to be the common refuge of humanity. Neverthelefs, fuch views as thefe, however ufeful or even precious to myfelf, remain mere professions of faith, of little or no confequence to others, until reafons are adduced in their fupport; and iconoclafm has but its trouble for its pains, if it replace no broken images. I think it will be conceded that all the conceptions of life which have fwayed the fcientific and philofophical minds of men, are more or lefs hypothetical, and in their effence purely fpeculative. This feems neceffary when, in the nature of the cafe, no theorem is demonstrable, and degrees of reafonable probability are the uttermost approaches to the heart of this fafcinating infcrutability, refpecting which the credo ut intelligam of the theologian complements the cogito ergo fum of the metaphyfician; belief being no lefs poftulated by reafon than is being affirmed in think-

ing. Such apology, if any be needed, is all I have to offer in oppofing the fpontaneous generation fpeculation by the vitaliftic theory, and propofing to recognize the hypothefis of a God-made cofmos, inflead of the hypothefis of a felf-made perpetual-motion machine.*

Life in the concrete is, of courfe, the fum of the phenomena manifested by animated nature. Of life in the abstract, of the effence or nature of that peculiar attribute of plants and animals, apart from its material manifestations, no knowledge whatever feems possible. Yet, while I cannot even imagine

[* "This ultimate and higheft induction of fcientific thought - the Infcrutable made Abfolute - is reftful and fatisfying. This ultimate and higheft induction - as higheft and ultimate - cannot be manipulated as a 'working hypothesis.' This ultimate and highest induction - as such cannot be fubjected to the fubfequent verification of mathematical deduction. This ultimate and highest induction detracts nothing from the certainty of orderly fequence fo irrefiftibly impreffed upon us by every deepening channel of refearch, but gives us rational ground and guarantee of fuch unfailing regularity. This ultimate and highest induction, accepting to the uttermost the mechanical interpretation of nature's administration. - whole ceaseles Evolution feems ever opening up new vistas of automatic teleology, -- gives fignificance to our imperfect conception of a regulated fyftem, (fo neceffarily involved in the very existence and operation of a 'machine,') and accounts confiftently for the unfaltering obedience and inftantaneous response of all the countless atoms of the univerfe to the reign of 'law,' by politing behind fuch law - an Infinite LAW-GIVER." - TAYLOR, loc. cit., p. 173.]

what life is or may be, apart from matter, fo far is it from being impoffible for me to conceive of life as an existent reality apart from any known conditions of matter, that it is impoffible for me not to form that conception. This is of courfe to invoke the "vital principle," to postulate the reality of a kind of force called "vital," as a veritable Biogen or lifegiver, which may be where no known form of matter is, and can, therefore, exift apart from fuch matter, and not as a refultant of any material forces. Though this is pure fpeculation. I am forced fo to fpeculate, in the impoffibility of conceiving the contrary. The conception does not imply that vital force differs from other forms of cofmic energy otherwife than as different branches form one ftream; for all force is one, however diverse its ulterior operation; the kind of force called "vital" being that fpecial potency under the agency of which matter affumes the form and functions of life in the concrete. Force cannot act where it is not; neither can it act with nothing to act upon; its prefence in and operation upon matter are, therefore, neceffary conditions of its manifestation; all the manifestations of life are ultimately refolvable into modes of motion, and in the particular modes of motion exhibited by living things, and by no others, are evidenced the prefence and operation of the vital principle, the energy of which differs from other energies precifely as the modes of motion

of living things differ from those of all things that do not live. This is not a verbal diffinction merely; if it feems fo, the fault is in the obfcurity of my expression of the perfectly clear idea every one has of the difference between that which is alive and that which is not. It fubfifts in the prefence or absence of fomething - fome real entity, which defies observation by the fenfes, and, therefore, cannot be defcribed : but the refults of which are exhibited in the moft unequivocal manner. If preffed for more concife flatement, I may turn the expression, faying that life, fo far from being the refult of the aggregation of matter, in confequence of any conditionings known as chemical or mechanical, exifts apart from matter, as a vera caufa, preceding the organization of matter; life being, in fhort, the caufe, and not the confequence, of organization. It certainly precedes organization and exifts in unorganized matter, as any fcrap of living plaffon demonftrates. Furthermore, the higheft known grade of organization, as the body of a man, though never attained except through vital force, may and does exift without life, as any corpfe mutely teftifies until decomposition or diforganization fets in. If life inhered in matter as the neceffary refult of any particular composition of matter, death would follow decomposition, and be otherwise impossible; but in fact the reverfe is the actual fequence of events.

If there be any truth in the ftatement that life is an entity. a reality, apart from any known forms of matter, it is perfectly logical to fpeak of its prefence in or abfence from any given mass of matter; and this was my idea when I noted the fum of a living being as greater than the fum of its dead material parts. I also used the word "God" when fatirizing the apotheofis of protoplasm. I have thus far purposely refrained from using the word "fpirit." But I cannot proceed with my idea of life without introducing that term, to which I am aware much of the accredited fcience and philosophy of the day objects, as being "found without fenfe." Yet no fcientift who acknowledges the validity of the fcience of pfychology, and no philosopher who recognizes the validity of abstract ideas, objects to the word "mind." I must therefore be permitted to fpeak of fpirit, or "foul," if you pleafe, as fomething which, like mind, is a legitimate fubject of inquiry: first, as to whether it exist or no; fecond, if it exist, whether it be of protoplasmic nature or no; third, if it be not that product of the aggregation of matter, what fort of a product it may be; for I confider this inquiry efpecially pertinent to any discuffion of life. Our alternative, you know, is, that all vital phenomena, all manifestations whatsoever of life, are to be counted among the accomplifhments of protoplafm, or are to be otherwife accounted for.

Much difference of opinion as to the reality of "foul" might be reconciled if difputants could catch each other's meaning and agree upon a definition of the term. But this is very difficult, though we all think we know what is meant when a human foul is in mention. Many deny there to be any fuch thing; many waive the queftion, neither affirming nor denying; most ascribe a foul to man alone; some concede a foul to every atom of inorganic matter as well as to all organized bodies. My view defines foul as the quantity of "fpirit" which any living being may or does poffefs at any time. But this requires a definition of "fpirit," fome quantity of which is to make a foul, just as fome amount of matter makes a body. I can attach no idea to the term "fpirit," from which all conceptions of matter are not abfolutely excluded. Spirit is nothing if not immaterial. Force is likewife immaterial; but I think nearly all perfons recognize a diftinction between fpirit and any mechanical force, fuch as gravitation. My mind affords no definition of fpirit, if I may not call it *felf-confcious force*. Self-confcious force being illimitable in time and fpace, and its fum being, in a word, infinite, I am unable to draw any diffinction between fpirit in its totality and that Universal Mind, or Supreme Intelligence, which we mean when we fpeak or think of God.

To my mind, "mind in nature" is a felf-evident propofi-

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tion - a logical neceffity. The fimple fact that we can think a God, neceffitates the conclusion most men have reached, of the existence in nature of other than what are called "natural forces ;" of the reality of the exiftence of fpirit as felf-confcious force; though I do not fee why it is not as "natural" a force as gravitation. It is certainly not unnatural; and to call it "fupernatural" only exposes our ignorance of Nature - Nature being, on any theiftic hypothesis, simply the sum of the manifestations of the will of God. The French epigram, "If there be no God man must invent one," may be pharaphrafed to fay, "If there were no God man could not invent one." I cannot fuppofe my mind to be peculiarly conftituted; and, as I find the conceptions just noted prefent in it, as propositions which are nothing if not felf-evident, if not axiomatic data of confcioufnefs, I prefume the fame idea can or does prefent itfelf to most other perfons. But by our definition, "foul" is a portion of fpirit, and fpirit is felf-confcious. I am likewife felf-confcious; and by that quality of being I know, with a certainty no doubt can diffurb, with a certitude no argument can increase or diminish, that I have a soul. For to doubt is to judge; to judge is to reafon; while the knowledge I have of my own foul comes not by taking thought; it is the foul's felf-confcioufnefs. Some call it "faith ;" I have no objection to that term ; it is fomething fo

precious, fo fuperior to reafon, though never irrational, that I would greatly prefer to recognize it as a property of protoplafm than to lofe it.

Finding myfelf alfo in poffeffion of a body, of the actual exiftence of which body few perfons, excepting fome German metaphyficians and their fuckling converts, are in doubt, and alfo obferving that this body is alive, that is to fay, that it manifefts all the phenomena neceffary to our conceptions of life, I am bound to infer, and I do infer, that in my own cafe at leaft, life fubfifts in the union of foul and body; that life confifts in the animation of matter by fpirit; that life is God made confcioufly manifeft. If there be any truth in this, I fuppofe it is equally true of other human beings, though I only anfwer for myfelf.

My mind refufes to believe, what fome may object, that fuch expreffions as I have ufed refpecting the reality of fpirit are mere abftractions — mere metaphyfical fubtleties metaphorically expreffed — in other words, mere figments of the imagination. I would fooner grant, what fome metaphyficians fancy they have proved, namely, that we have no bodies. To do away with the body altogether — at any rate, with every body excepting one's own, appears to be one of the accomplifhments of fome fchools of thought. Such exploiting in the faw-duft of an intellectual gymnafium feems to me

a fimple and eafy trick, in comparison with the effort to deny the foul; for the body is but an accident of matter, and the procefs of annihilating it in imagination only anticipates a natural process by a brief span of time, and time is nothing but a fequence of events which cannot occur if there be nothing to happen. But to do away with fpirit, even in imagination, is not naturally poffible. It is futile to attempt, as fome "philosophers" have done, to avoid all poffible contradictories, and evade the poffibility that "pure reafon" may be fallible or fallacious, by denying the exiftence of the fubject of every poffible predication, thus evolving a "philofophy" of which univerfal negation is the fole final outcome. What philosophy — what "love of wifdom " — is here, when we are left nothing to love! For the act of denial, or even refufal to affirm, implies a denier or a refuser, as an existent reality, and the denial or refufal is itfelf an existent reality. True it is, and difmally true, that the philosophy of universal negation, by fome called "criticifm of pure reafon," is intellectual nihilifm - a fort of philosophic fool's paradife, or earthly Nirvana, where one has not even the Buddhiftic privilege of mumbling "Aum," for fear there may be fome miftake about it. Such a ftate of mind is not even an afylum of ignorance in which poor humanity may take refuge; it is an afylum in which intellectual impotency holds not the mirror up to nature but to its confessed felf.

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But this is unpremeditated digreffion. The point I wifhed to make, when those contemptuous thoughts obtruded, is, that as denial implies a denier, and as both are real entities, though denial is an absolute immateriality, the real entity of fuch an equally absolute immateriality as I hold fpirit to be is not à priori impossible. It may exist therefore; I have postulated that it actually does exist, and defined it as felf-confcious force; I have speculated that a living body results from the action of spirit on matter, and that life subsists on the union of the two. To bring the question into some fcientific shape — to put it on the border-land between metaphysics and psychology, if not really in the domain of the latter fcience, let me fay a few words respecting the connection between mind and matter.

The only points toward which all differences of opinion in this vexed queftion converge are the intimacy of the connection and the intricacy of a relation in which the two factors —mind and matter—are inter-dependent and inter-active. For even those who hold, as I do, that mind does not depend upon matter for its existence, but only for its manifestation, if they know anything of anatomy and physiology, know how powerfully physical states affect mental operations. Those who maintain the chemico-physical theory of life necessfarily consider all mental, like all physical phenomena, as the re-

fultants of the play of mechanical forces, and as ultimately referable to mere motion of material particles - fuch mental endowments as will, memory and understanding, judgment, intuition, perception, conception, confcience and confcioufnefs itfelf depending for their existence upon how stands the parallelogram of forces, how goes the balance of power in the mad clash of blind atoms. My hypothesis, which recognizes the existence of spirit as determining life, and makes life the caufe inftead of the confequence of organization, enables us to reconstruct the parallelogram of forces, and strike the balance of power not between the mechanical forces of the material particles themfelves, but between thefe and the confcious power of fpirit - the Will of the Ego. This is the refultant which apparently conftitutes "mind." Viewing the intenfe and vivid molecular activities, the combustion and deflagration of tiffue, which attend the generation of every thought, and are neceffary to the manifestation of thought, though in no fense its originators, it is fcarcely using metaphorical language to fay that mind refides at the melting-point of matter in fpirit.*

[* See Appendix, 6th paragraph. In penning "Biogen" for oral delivery, I purpofely followed that common ulage of the words "fpirit" and "foul" which makes thefe two terms nearly fynonymous, or at any rate alternative, exprefiions for all that there is of a man which may furvive 1

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To illuftrate fuch fufion as I have imagined, let us confider the two opposite things which, according to univerfal experience, concur in the alembic of mind. I refer, of courfe, to any fubjective and any objective cognition. Let us formulate any fubjective cognition in the general expression "I will," and any objective cognition in the term "I fee."

Afide from the fummary cognition "I am," nothing can be conceived more original, fpontaneous, independent, and felfdetermining than "I will." This cognition affected, at whatever expense of brain-tiffue, *will-power* has been confciously called into being; it has been created; it exists as a real entity, at the fervice of its originator, to be utilized as he determines. This feems to be the purest example of *force* of which any one can be confcious. To think "I will" is to command force. But fo long as this confcious determination remains inoperative, it is only potential energy or latent force, which may or may not become active and effectual. If it do not act effectively upon *fomething*, no manifestation of power is possible, and the very existence of the energy is unknowable,

the death of his body; not defiring to open any difcuffion of the point involved here. The diffinction I make is formulated and definitely fet forth in the Appendix, where also will be found fome further reflections upon the meaning of the word "mind" — mind not being a thing which thinks (for that would be fpirit), but the expression of what is thought.]

excepting to its creator; it is only felf-exiftent, in fhort. Once tranflated in terms of matter, with motion or any other cognizable effect, the exiftence, operation, and refult of a caufe are difcovered. If we knew how this tranflation is accomplifhed, we fhould know exactly how the connection between mind and matter is made; but we do not, and can only reft in the knowledge that fomehow the brain is the material mechanifm by which the will of the owner of that apparatus is primarily manifefted. Will-power is carried out further by the reft of the bodily machinery, and may be finally accomplifhed in a thoufand ways. But obferve, that all fuch manifeftation of force is the manifeftation not of mechanical or chemical force merely, but of *intelligent volition*; that is to fay, of felf-confcious force; which, according to our definition of fpirit, is fpirit.

To many minds it might be to fow the feeds of reverence for the exalted dignity of humanity to reflect that fuch mental operation as I have defcribed is the counterfeit, in the finite human microcofm, of the defcribed creation of the macrocofm by infinite power divine. The Univerfal Mind, the Supreme Intelligence, the great I Am, which was and is and fhall be always, determined, it is faid, to become manifeft. He faid "let there be," and there was, as He willed. And man is faid to be made in His image.

Now let us glance at the other chain of fequence --- that involved in the term "I fee," as the general expression for all fenfe-concepts. One would think this a very fimple propofition; fo it is, if its full meaning be grafped; but half grafped, or even only just miffed, the proposition is unintelligible. Such appears to be the difficulty with those who, for the fimple truth "I fee," try to fubfitute the untruth "the brain fees;" for they fail to fee at all through the mass of fquirming brain-amœbas which are tormented to death in the procefs of their reflections on the fubject. No one fuppofes the eye fees, any more than any other optical inftrument fees ; nor the optic nerve, any more than the eyeball; nor the corpora quadrigemina than the nerve; yet there is a blind kind of physiology which feems to think that vision, the faculty of feeing, which cannot be found at the outer end of the optical inftrument, must lurk about the inner end of that exquisite apparatus. But I must believe, as I do, that, trace the nervous threads as far back as you pleafe, and locate the exact fpot in the brain where they end, there would be no feeing done if fome Ego - that identical fpiritual Ego I poftulate -were not looking through the telescope life has organized for the purpofe, and as fully confcious of feeing as I am at this In fine, I know that it is I who does the feeing, moment. with the fame certitude that I know who is fpeaking; and I

do *not* believe any one of you to be differently conftituted in this refpect. Truly, the difficulty of underftanding *how* the phyfical terms of a retinal image can be translated into the mental terms of confcious vision, has never been overcome; our ignorance is abfolute; if it ever is overcome, no doubt we shall learn what and where is the connection between mind and matter.

I fpeculate that not only is it among the poffibilities of living protoplasm to establish that connection, but that among the qualities of that pregnant fubftance, or of fome of its material derivatives, is one adequate to the eftablifhment of the required relation. Chemistry has shown the compofition of the dead fubftance - the number and proportion of the elements composing it - even the mode in which its molecular units are, or may reafonably be inferred to be, compounded. The extreme inftability of the refulting combination, and the extraordinary activities acquired, are well-If we can be permitted to vivify fuch a dead known. fubftance as this with biogen or any thing elfe, it is difficult to fet any bounds to its poffibilities as a mediator or gobetween mind and matter - in fhort, between the fpirit and the body. I hypothecate for living protoplasm - for the dead substance the chemist knows plus biogen, a vastly greater degree of molecular inftability, and immeafurably more ener-

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getic molecular or perhaps atomic activity, than have been afcribed to the dead tiffue, fimply as an extension of the conditionings which have been afcribed to dead protoplafm as laws of its chemico-physical being. I fpeculate upon the reafonable probability that under the influence of vital force protoplasm may and does acquire such tenuity of substance, fuch mobility and activity, as to be fairly defcribable as matter at a minimum of denfity combined with force at a maximum of intenfity; and to be comparable in fuch vital ftage of its evolution to that interftellar fluid which is fcientifically recognized as the medium of the transfer of force everywhere. the undulations of a luminiferous æther - a fubstance vaftly more tenuous than any we know by our fenfes, yet fubitantial ftill, and perhaps ftill far from the dividing line between matter and fpirit, where pure fpirit is purged of the last dregs of materiality - if fuch an æther, the very existence of which is hypothetical, yet an accepted fcientific fact, becaufe no other effort of the imagination fupplies fo good an hypothefis on which to explain the phenomena of light - if this æther can be logically inferred to exift, it is no romance of the imagination to infer that matter may be animated to the degree of fublimation required for its vibration to will-power - its thrilling to a thought.

Such ftate of matter as I imagine and defcribe would fatisfy

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at leaft one of the important factors of the life-problem, by eftablishing a connection between mind and matter. The thing is already done when a fingle atom of matter is moved in the leaft by the flightest conficious force.

I have often thought that the phenomena of life may be inftructively compared with those of light, there being fome highly fuggeftive parallelifms between the two things. Life and light are curioufly coupled in vulgar parlance, an unfophifticated mind vaguely perceiving fome fimilarity, just as it couples the corresponding negations, death and darkness. Old and early as is light-not impoffibly antedating moft other cofmities or orderings of things - how new and late are not the conclusions of fcience refpecting its physical basis! Light was only diffected yesterday, to discover all prior textbooks of its anatomy to be wrong. To-day no one queftions the existence of luminiferous æther as a real substance, in the vibrations of which the quality of light fubfifts and is manifested. But this state of matter is impalpable, invisible, inaudible, inodorous, and infipid - in fhort, inappreciable to the phyfical fenfes. We know nothing about it, as matter; we only know it is a mode of motion of matter in an unknown ftate. Force is obvioufly prefent and operative; matter is only an inference. But a fubftantial æther is a dictum of fcience, figned, fealed, and delivered. A vivid exercise of the

imagination it must have originally been, and a lively act of faith in the evidence of things unfeen, to fet the matter before the reafon, judgment, or critical faculty in fuch fhape that the mind could not only affirm the verity, but be unable to deny the truth, as to the nature of light. How many men, in the hiftory of intellectual achievement, are found capable of fuch fplendid believing that they may underftand - yet credo ut intelligam is required to unlock any of the great fecrets of Nature, no lefs than is it neceffary to penetrate the world of fpirit. In the nature of the human mind fuch rational faith is the key of difcovery. Imagination engenders, belief cherifhes, obfervation nourifhes, reflection educates, and judgment approves — then the refult takes care of itfelf, as a mature fcientific truth. The accepted theory of light, in fimpleft expression, is, an unknown but believed-in state of matter in a known mode of motion - it is matter at an ineftimable minimum of denfity moving with extraordinary velocity under a force of enormous intenfity.

On the other hand, the groffly material bafis of life is perceived by all experience — the body of any plant or animal fhows what number and kind of known ftates of matter may be informed and inftinct with the life-principle, among which are fand and lime and iron, and many others, befides those composing the fupposed ultimate physical basis of life, proto-

plafm; while what amount of motion is imparted by what kind or degree of force has proven thus far ineftimable. What may actually be the facts in the cafe, however, fo far from being inconceivable, is to my mind a very thinkable proposition, with the possible truth of which no known phenomena of life are necessfarily irreconcilable.

Thus, fince I cannot imagine force primarily acting upon matter in bulk - like kicking a ftone - it is neceffary to infer, for the validity of the vitaliftic theory of life, an exceffively tenuous flate of matter fet in motion by an exceffively active force - just as I did when speculating upon the connection I imagined to exift between mind and matter. Such conditioning of matter and force would be ftrictly comparable to what is known of the nature of light. It would be the analogue of - perhaps the homologue of - poffibly identical with - that interstellar fluid which is recognized by fcience as the univerfal medium of transmitting energy. It would, however, differ from light in feveral important and effential particulars. To fatisfy the conditions of the theory, the fubftance or phyfical bafis of biogen would be perhaps as much more tenuous than luminiferous æther as is the latter more fluidic than hydrogen; it would be at the actual minimum of denfity at which it is poffible for force of any kind to be transmitted, and fo operative and manifest. The velocity

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of motion would be only lefs than infinitely greater than the known velocity of light, for it would be at the rate of fpeed at which thought can be transmitted. And as to the kind of force which would effect fuch motion of fuch matter, it would differ from any kind generally recognized, in that it would be felf-confcious; that is to fay, it would be pure fpirit.

According to the terms of my fpeculation, the vital principle is a real entity — an *ens realiffimum*, the incorporation of which in protoplafm or any other combination of grofs matter makes fuch matter "alive," and the diffolution of which from fuch matter leaves the latter "dead." Biogen itfelf, of courfe, is alive; it *is* life; and biogen may be defined as fpirit in combinatiou with the minimum of matter neceffary to its manifeftation. Biogen is fimply foul-ftuff,* as contradiftinguifhed from ordinary matter; it is the fubftance which compofes that thing which a well-known and very frequently quoted writer calls the "fpiritual body."

I have fpoken to little purpofe, and my expressions have been ill-chosen, if what I have faid feems novel to you; if you do not discover in what I have faid simply a restatement,

[* "Mind-ftuff," and the "hypothetical fubftance of mind," are expreffions already in current ulage among fcientific writers of repute. What is meant by these terms I cannot imagine, unless indeed it be that very real thing which I here call "foul-ftuff."]

in fomewhat "fcientific" language, of one of the oldeft, and I think one of the wifeft, of the world's conceptions of the life-principle, as a direct effluence of the Deity. It is the old anima mundi, foul of the world, "workfhop of nature," where the will of God is first fashioned in form and substance to receive the breath of life. And it is inftructive to note, that in the whole hiftory of human notions respecting the origin and nature of life, the theory of fpontaneous generation, which the ftrongeft fcience of to-day most ftrongly difclaims, is the one which has taken the leaft hold upon the human mind. Biogenetic fpeculation has almost invariably flowed in the ftream which bears the idea of father and fon upon its bofom. Let us not deceive ourfelves with the giving new names to old things. Call them what you pleafe - modern materialistic and atheistic notions about life are every one of them difguifes of the plain ftatement that a felf-created atom of matter lays an egg that will hatch. Call this a monftrous abfurdity, an inftigation of the devil, if you choose; I can call it neither fcience, nor philosophy, nor religion, nor anything that is learned, wife, or true.

To my mind the *anima mundi* belief, as I reftate it in terms of the biogen theory, acquires color from the confideration that it is exactly the complement, and perhaps the natural antinomy, of generally received views refpecting the evolution

of chemical elements and chemical compounds from indifferent flates of nebulous matter; and not unlikely to be quite The progreffive confolidation of matter, during as true. which the most diffuse, most tenuous and indifferent substances are gradually differentiated and then combined to form the various products known as "elements," to be recombined in endlefs diverfity to form "inorganic" and "organic compounds"-fuch procefs would feem to involve as its neceffary conditioning the universal antinomy, that at a certain ftage of molecular aggregation reached by certain forms of matter, the counteractive vital principle comes into operation to arreft the confolidation, to bring matter out of the depths of grofs materiality it has reached to the fublimity of effectual contact with spirit. Whence emanated matter in the beginning is infcrutable; from nowhere, certainly - if not from the felf-confcious, felf-determining universal Mind which willed to fo become manifeft. Where to? Nowhere, certainly — if not to whence it came, to complete the circle, fymbol of infinity, whofe quadrature is unknown.

Equally unknown are the time, the place, the circumftance of the origination of life. We may learn of these things when we discover what is matter divorced from force; for of neither of these things, apart from the other, if they be not one in effence and that effence pure spirit, do we know

anything at all. The vital principle, which I must inceffantly invoke to fatisfy the fundamental data of my confcioufnefs, is equally infcrutable; but it is peculiar, in that it is not known to be manifested except in confequence of itfelf, or to refide long in any one glomeration of grofs matter, or to ever die. I am bound to confider it as the most direct and immediate natural manifestation we have of the Great First Cause, and consequently to refer it at once far back of any fuch fecondary caufe as a mechanical or chemical law. I cannot fuppofe it will ever be determined either to originate in protoplafm or any other material compound, or to permanently refide in anything that retains the leaft veftige of materiality. Being abfolutely beyond the fcrutiny of the phyfical fenfes, it would fcarcely appear to fall within the fcope either of fcience or philosophy; and I doubt that human reason, unenlightened by revelation, can learn much about it; for that would be to find out God by taking thought.

Since the retiring Prefident of this Society has declared that neither fcience nor philosophy affords any foundation of proof upon which my confcious mind may build hopes of that immortality of the foul which is to that fame mind a neceffary conditioning of its existence, it is to be hoped that fcience may yet discover facts enough, and philosophy find truth enough, to render that happy refult possible; for until they

do, they are together obvioufly incompetent to deal with the life-problem; and until they do, fellow-men muft be permitted to interpret the great fecret each after his own methods, as beft fuits his own neceffities; even thould thefe force him to take refuge in fome credible formulation of faith, as in fomething which certainly promifes more than fcience and philofophy have accomplifhed, and may contain the germs of a good working fcientific hypothefis.

But there is fcience and fcience, more or lefs intelligent or intelligible. There is philofophy and philofophy — that of Socrates, and that of Kant, for example. In fuch wealthy embarraffment, the real lover of wifdom may be inclined to feek the truth in ways that vex his mind leaft, and at leaft leave him at peace with his foul, ignorant though he be of its origin, nature, and deftiny.

Here, gentlemen, I fhould ceafe fpeaking. But my fpeculations have been furrendered to your criticifm; and, as I know that many colors are reflected in the mental fpectrum of the philosophers present, I beg you, in the discuffion about to ensue, to resolve my doubts in the following particulars:

What is the difference between a Godlefs, felf-created, always-existent cosmos of matter-in-motion alone, and any

perpetual-motion machine which men have dreamed of inventing, but which philosophy declares impoffible?

What is the difference between any mechanical or chemical theory of the origin of life, and that fpontaneous generation of life which fcience declares to be unknown?

What is the chemico-phyfical difference between a live amœba and a dead one? And if there be no chemical or phyfical difference, in what does the great difference fubfift?

What is the principal difference between a living human being and his dead body, if it be not the prefence or abfence of the foul? And if it be nothing like this, what, then, is it more like?





APPENDIX.

A MAN'S "mind" is not a *thing*, in the ordinary fenfe of the word thing. It is a relation between two things. Thefe two things are, his foul and his body. The mind is the refult of the interaction between fpirit and matter. It is what the fpirit thinks in confequence of its connection with matter. It is the knowledge which the fpirit acquires by its experience in contact with matter. It is what the fpirit muft become incarnated to difcover and appropriate. It is what the fpirit retains when it becomes difembodied. It is the knowledge of good and evil. It is the fruit of the tree of life.

Reafon is the miftrefs of the mind, and its exercife is judgment, or the critical faculty. But its data are only those which it receives through the avenues of fense. The bodily fenses are obviously and notoriously fallible. Reafoning upon fuch data as the bodily fenses give may therefore be equally deceptive; and thus the refults of reafon are often fallacious, though its processes may be perfectly logical. Hence what any man *thinks, i.e.*, his mind, may be very wrong indeed, fince it is necessarily based upon the experiences of his fpirit with matter.

On the other hand, a man's foul is a thing, in a proper fense of that word. It is a fubstantial reality, an actual entity, a living being of knowable and recognizable qualities, attributes and potencies. It is not merely

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a thought, or an idea, or any metaphyficality. It confifts of a kind of femi-material fubstance, which is the body of the spirit, bearing much the fame relation to pure fpirit that the physical body bears to the foul itfelf. The fubftance of the foul is the means and medium of connection or communication between fpirit and matter. Soul-ftuff is animalized aftral fluid; that is to fay, fome quantity of the universal æther, modified by vital force, individualized by a man's fpirit, and appropriated to the ufes of an individual fpirit, just as a certain quantity of groffer matter is individualized and appropriated to the formation of the physical body. The fubstance of the foul, to which I apply the name 'biogen,' feems to correfpond closely to what Prof. Crookes calls the 'fourth state of matter;' and fome demonstrable activities of matter in this radiant state appear to be fummed by him in the term 'pfychic force.' It is the 'od' of Prof. Reichenbach, and many of the manifestations of its activities are grouped under the expression 'odic force.' It is what some appear to mean by the term ' hypothetical fubftance of mind.' It ferves as an 'æfthetophore' - to borrow a word coined by Prof. Cope. One of its modes of motion was demonstrated by Galvani. The commonest and best-known exhibitions of its active agency are those of our bodily fensations and movements, its currents to and fro between a human fpirit and that fpirit's carnal envelope being defcribed by modern phyfiologifts as fenfory and motor nerve-impulses.

Some modification of foul-ftuff exifts in all animals and plants — in all things which have life, if not alfo in those other things which we call inanimate. In the higher animals — in man at any rate — it becomes the vehicle, the envelope, and the inftrument of fpirit, indwelling in the physical body fo long as that body is "alive," and leaving it at what is called death, which is when the fpirit entirely withdraws from the physical body, carrying its foul-ftuff along. Thus a man, in this world and in the flesh, confifts of three different and feparable things. Ist. His physical body, certain transfient atomic and molecular aggregations of folid, fluid, and

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gafeous matter. 2d. His foul, a certain fubfance temporarily in contact and very intimate connection with his body, on the one hand, and with his fpirit, on the other, ferving as a medium between the two. 3d. His fpirit, of which he knows nothing, though his fpirit knows itfelf perfectly well. "Death" is fimply the difengagement of the third and fecond of thefe from the firft. The deferted phyfical body, no longer animated by the fpirit acting through the foul, is "dead"; it has loft its "vitality"; the "vital principle," which is fimply the force by which the fpirit acts upon matter through the medium of the foul, is no longer operative; and the body in this ftate, *i.e.*, dead, is only acted upon by phyfical and chemical forces. It then furnifhes a very proper fubject for the chemicophyfical theory to explain and account for.

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"Mind," as the expression of a relation between the foul and the body, neceffarily difappears when that relation is difcontinued. But a far higher order of intelligence, volition and will-power is manifefted by the fpirit as foon as it is feparated from the phyfical body. Having then a dual being only, instead of a triple mode of existence; replacing mere mental reafon with those higher spiritual faculties whose glimmerings and faint forefhadowings in this life it used to call "imagination"; contrasting more clearly than it could while in the flefh the meannefs of the intellectual with the majefty of the moral faculties; appreciating the great gulf fixed between good and evil; limited in its activities neither by the three dimenfions of fpace to which it was confined while in the body, nor by the modes of motion then known; -- the human being has entered upon another fphere of existence by an evolutionary process as natural as that by which he paffed from the womb to the world. The transition is probably lefs abrupt, in most cases, and there is no reason to suppose that the change is any greater. The body does not appear to be any more neceffary to the existence of the foul in the other world than is the after-birth to the existence of the body in this one.

From what has preceded it is evident that what I mean by "foul" is

not exactly according to the general usage of the word; which usage commonly makes "foul" and "fpirit" one and the fame. Thus, when we fpeak familiarly of "a man's foul," we also fay it is "his immortal spirit," meaning thereby, anything and all there is to a man which is capable of furviving death. But, as already stated, I draw a wide distinction between "foul" and "fpirit." Spirit is nothing if not immaterial, and to "fpirit" proper we can attach no fignificance if we do not confider it as divefted of every trace of materiality. Soul, on the contrary, is fubftantial, and femi-material: it is the "body of the fpirit," neceffary, fo far as we know, to all and every manifestation of the spirit. Spirit cannot act directly upon matter, but only through the intermediation of this foul-fubftance. A human being, after "death," confifts of this fubftance, acted upon by his fpirit, the two together conftituting what is ordinarily called his "foul." To this fubstance, when acted upon by, and ferving for the manifestation of, fpirit, I give the name of biogen. The fame fubftance (biogen) acted upon by the fpirit before the death of the body, and ferving for the operations of fpirit upon matter, is the "vital principle," the action of which we call "vital force," and the refults of which action we call "vitality" or "life."

I do not admit for an inftant that biogen is merely an idea, or thought, of mine or any one elfe—a metaphyfical abstraction, a mere mode of expression or a mere mode of motion either. It is not, furthermore, a relation subsisting between two things. Nor is it a "force," in the ordinary fense of the term. It is a THING, a very real thing, an ens realifimum, possible qualities and attributes which may be investigated by proper scientific methods, and by scientific experimentation, quite as readily as any other of the fo-called "imponderables" of nature. It is as open to examination as luminiferous æther, and its properties, if not its substance, may be studied as we would study light, heat, or electricity; it is therefore not only a proper object of science, but a proper subject of philosophy.

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APPENDIX.

Under ordinary circumstances, biogen is inappreciable to the physical fenfes, however manifest its effects. Under exceptional circumstances it acquires very fentible properties, the principal of which are visibility and tangibility. It may then be both feen and felt. Its modes of motion appear to differ in fome refpects from any of those known to us to be poffible to grofs matter, and to require for their complete exhibition more than three dimensions of space. Its excessive tenuity, extraordinary elafticity, compreffibility, homogeneity and fome other qualities, lead me to fuppofe that one great difference between biogen and most known states of matter may be, that it is not of atomic conftitution. If hydrogen, the most fubtile and tenuous gas known, cannot exist in a free state except two of its atoms be joined in a molecule - and this is good found chemiftry of the day - it may be that biogen confifts of free atoms; that is to fay, differs chiefly from other kinds of matter in having no molecular conftitution. More probably, however, - viewing fome of its properties and activities — it is to be confidered not even atomic in conflictution having no atoms of any fize or fhape or diftance apart - no fixed points of greater denfity than their intervening spaces. In this view, biogen would be fimply tomic matter as diffinguished from atomic matter; and to fo regard it may be well, for the prefent at leaft.

During the earthly life of the individual, a perfon's biogen appears to be normally confined to the limits of his phyfical body; or at any rate to make but faint and feeble excursions therefrom during his waking hours. In fleep, however, when the spirit is temporarily withdrawn from the outer world by the closure of the usual avenues of the fenses, the biogen is much freer in its excursions, and may almost entirely leave the body at the will, confciously or unconfciously exerted, of the spirit. Probably no perfon " is himself" fo much as in his dreams, under these conditions; a fact which Shakespeare doubtles knew, familiar as he was with the properties of biogen, when he wrote that we are such study as dreams are made of. More obvious though less familiar exhibitions of the excur-

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